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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
DOTY LYN BROWN ) 
Petitioner/Appellant ) Brief of Appellan 
) 
v ) Case Number 960396 
) 
STATE OF UTAH; ) Priority Number Three 
HENRY GALETKA, Warden ) 
Appellee ) 
) 
- JURISDICTION -
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2 (3)(i) confers jurisdiction on this Court to decide this 
matter in that it involves a conviction of second degree murder, a first degree felony. 
- STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW -
ISSUE ONE: Because the District Court dismissed the case without hearing, was the 
Court in a position to determine that the case was frivolous when the attachments to the 
Petition clearly proved the Appellant's contentions to each issue establishing grounds for 
relief? 
This Court, in reviewing a decision to dismiss a Petition for extraordinary relief, 
reviews that decision to dismiss for correctness; State-v-Pena 869 P2d 932, 935 (Utah 
1994); Smith-v-Cook 803 P2d 788, 790 (Utah 1990). 
ISSUE TWO: Did the District Court abuse its discretion in not letting the Appellant 
proceed with his ineffective assistance of Counsel and conflict of interest claims on his 
Appellate Counsel when this issue established "good cause" and "unusual circumstances" 
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to rehash some issues raised on appeal and factually supported the request for "Habeas 
Relief, on the grounds of plain error? Standard of review is a mixed question of fact and 
law, Strickland-v-Washington 466 US 688, 698 (1984). Because there are no findings of 
fact in this case but the issue is documented in the record presents this as a question of 
law which is reviewed for correctness, State-v-Johnson 823 P2d 484, 487 (UT App. 
1991). However, in an abundance of caution, the Appellant includes as part of this 
appeal, how this appeal presents exceptional circumstances and/or circumstances 
constituting plain error, State-v-Archambeau 820 P2d 920, 922-23 (UT Ct App. 1991), in 
the event these issues are determined to be raised first time on appeal. 
- CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS -
All provisions of law are either quoted in their entirety in the brief or attached in the 
addendum if lengthy. 
- STATEMENT OF CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS -
On or about 9/1/89 Appellant was appointed Alan Jeppeson to represent him in 
his trial for second degree murder in Tooele County. On or about 9/4/89 Appellant 
developed a conflict of interest and on 9/20/89 Counsel withdrew from the case. 
Appellant retained Paul Gotay and proceeded to trial on 2/14/90 Appellant was found 
guilty of second degree murder. Appellant could not afford to retain Mr. Gotay or 
otherwise retain any private Counsel for the purposes of appeal. 
On 3/12/90 a hearing was conducted and Mr. Gotay withdrew as Counsel. The 
Court reappointed Mr. Jeppeson, knowing and stating it knew of a conflict but stating that 
it would review the mater at a later date. This was over Mr. Gotay's objection as well as 
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the Appellants. The Court never conducted a hearing or made further inquiry into this 
conflicting situation and ended in Mr. Jeppeson representing the Appellant on his first 
appeal of right. See Addendum One 
On appeal Counsel raised several issues in his "Anders' brief1 which if properly 
raised, would have an arguable basis for reversible error. Counsel's conflict of interest let 
to a breakdown in his loyalty to his client and this is not only shown the way the brief 
presented the facts but also by the fact that the contents of this Anders' brief did not 
purport to the dictates of this court's directive in State-v-Clayton 639 P2d 168 (Utah 
1981). This was presented in the Petition in detail. 
Appellant then filed the instant Petition pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 65B(b) challenging the constitutional deprivations alleged during the pretrial 
proceedings through his first appeal of right as alleged in the Petition. 
Several weeks after filing the Petition, the court appointed Kevin Robson of 
Bertch & Birch to represent him in his post conviction proceedings. 
Shortly thereafter the State filed a motion to dismiss based on the State's newly 
enacted Statue of Limitations, limiting a Petition of that nature to being filed within one 
(1) year after the cause of action has accrued with some exceptions. See Addendum Two. 
Appellant's Counsel filed a reply to the State's motion to dismiss and a few 
months later the Court enters as order dismissing the Petition as being frivolous on its 
face. The District Court erred in dismissing this case without holding an evidentiary 
hearing because there were questions of fact at issue and whether the Appellant was, in 
fact, denied effective assistance of Counsel on appeal, whether the Court committed plain 
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error in re-appointing the Counsel which the Court knew was operating under a conflict 
of interest, and which the appellant had a conflict of interest with; the Court's failure to 
inquire into this conflict situation and other errors raised therein. 
The Appellant was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance 
of Counsel which implemented due process under the state and federal constitutions. 
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT -
The District Court erred in dismissing this Petition without an evidentiary hearing. 
Appellant raised facts which were supported in the record, facts material to the issue in 
question which are specific and particularized, not general or conclusory Under Utah's 
newly enacted Post Conviction Remedies Act, the Statue of Limitations found in 
§78-35a-107(3) provides that "if the Court finds that the interests of justice require, a 
Court may excuse a Petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations". 
Had the District Court properly reviewed the Petition and kept in mind this 
Court's, as well as the federal level decisions cited herein, the Court could have easily 
found that the interest of justice require the waiving of the statue. After all the court 
appointed Counsel shortly after the Petition was filed. 
The Court had to have reviewed the Petition and saw merit justifying appointment 
of Counsel. 
In any event, this Court has said in Earle-v- Warden of Utah State Prison 811 P2d 
180 (UT 1991) that a conviction or sentence that has not yet been fully and fairly 
adjudicated on appeal or in a prior habeas proceeding should not be denied reexamination 
because of procedural default. 
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These issues raised herein were not fully and fairly adjudicated on appeal because 
the Appellant's fourteenth and sixth amendment rights were compromised as stated in his 
arguments and supported in the record. This is the Appellant's position that the 
conviction must be reversed or vacated, or in the alternative, the Judgment of the Habeas 
Court must be reversed and remanded because since the Habeas Court held no hearing 
(but appointed Counsel) it had no occasion to determine whether the claims involved the 
constitutional issues raised or substantive issues involving state rules of procedure or 
discretionary issues. In that event the record before this Court provides no reasonable 
alternative basis by which to uphold the dismissal of the Petition. 
"If the case was, in fact, frivolous, why was the Petition served and Counsel 
appointed contrary to what §§(b)(7) of Rule 65B directs. But just the opposite occurred 
which §§(b)(8) directs the method of procedure when the Court determines that all or part 
of the Petition is not frivolous on its face. 
Didn't the Court know of the Statue of Limitations when it served the Petition? 
Of course it did. Since the State enacted §78-35a-107 et seq, it is apparent then that the 
Court did, in fact, see that the "interest of justice" would be served by the Petition being 
served and that the course of procedure directed in Rule 65B(b)(8)-(13) would be the 
procedural ave for that proceeding to ensue. Anything but that course would be an abuse 
of discretion". 
Point One: "The Court erred in dismissing the Petition 
without conducting a hearing. The Court was not in a 
position to determine the case was frivolous on its face 
when the attachments to the Petition clearly proved the 
Appellant to each issue establishing grounds for relief." 
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The record is unclear as to which provision the Court based its dismissal on; 
whether it was based on U.R. Civ. Rule 65B(b)(7): or whether on §78-35a-107(3). In any 
event, review is of a correction of error standard giving no deference to the Trial Court's 
decision because this decision is based on a question of law. See Addendum One. 
If the Court based its claim on 65B(b)(7) and that the issues were already adjusted 
in a prior appeal, the Appellant has established good cause and exceptional circumstances 
to revisit these issues by way of the ineffective assistance of Counsel issue raised herein. 
See Earle supra; Dunn-v-Cook 791 P2d 873, 876 (UT 1990) and Fernandez-v-Cook 783 
P2d 584 (UT 1989) stating that ineffective assistance of Counsel claim can properly be 
raised for the first time via habeas corpus when the allegedly incompetent Counsel 
handled trial and direct appeal. This case involves a conflict of interest where Counsel 
was fired before trial but reappointed for direct appeal resulting in his appeal being a 
sham. See Dunn Id 877, 878; See Hurst-v-Cook 777 P2d 1029, 1035 (UT 1989) 
(collecting cases on unusual circumstances). This is an issue of first impression. 
Further, the conviction has not been fully or fairly adjudicated on appeal. Then 
Counsel who represented the Appellant on appeal (which had the conflict of interest and 
which the Appellant had a conflict with) filed an Anders' brief which failed to purport to 
this Court's dictates outlined in State-v-Clavton 639 P2d 168 (UT 1981) (where this 
Court adopted Anders-v-California 386 U.S. 738 (1967), constituting a deprivation of due 
process. See Utah Article i§7 and the 14^ Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. See 
Earle Id 180, 181, and Dunn supra. 
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If the Court based its decision on the Statue of Limitations, the Court abused its 
discretion in not waiving it based on the basis that the interest of justice requires it to do 
so, if not on stare decisis of this Court's dictates but also on the Tenth Circuit and U. S. 
Supreme Court decisions establishing support for the Appellant's claims, but further on 
this Court's directive that ineffective assistance of Counsel is properly brought first time 
in a habeas proceeding. See Dunn, Fernandez supra. See also Bundy-v-Deland 763 P2d 
803 (UT 1988); State-v-Humphries 818 P2d 1027 (UT 1991). 
It is comfortable to assume this was the reason for dismissal since this was the 
issue raised by the State in its Motion to Dismiss. The Court committed plain error in not 
finding good cause to waive the Statue of Limitations and allowing the Appellant to 
proceed with his well documented claims. §78-35a-107(3) is a provision which confers 
authority on the Court to waive that provision when the interests of justice require it to do 
so. This is such a case which will be seen in Argument Two of this brief. 
In Currier-v-Holden P2d (UT Ct. App. 1993) the Appeals Court declared 
§78-35a-107' predecessor §78-12-31 unconstitutional. The Utah legislature enacted 
§78-35a-107 with its §§3 because it saw that there will be times when specific 
constitutional violations will need to be remedied after the statues 1 (one) year tolling 
period so it allowed that subsection for the Court to determine those times and when the 
interest of justice require the Court to invoke its judicial authority to remedy some sort of 
injustice. 
When good cause, unusual circumstances or the interest of justice require the 
Court to do so, and it fails to do so, it commits error, and abuses its discretion. 
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It is fundamental that a state cannot hold and physically punish an individual 
except in accordance with due process of law. When such an interest is at stake, an 
individual has "a strong interest in procedural safeguards that minimize the risk of 
wrongful punishment and provide for the resolution of disputed questions of 
justification," Ingraham-v-Wright 430 U.S. 651, 176 (1977). This interest is strong 
because of the serious sentence being served by the Appellant, a five year to life sentence 
for murder. Thus he has a right under due process to Petition the Court for relief and this 
right cannot be barred. The Hurst Court noted that the main purpose of an habeas corpus 
as a post conviction remedy is to provide a vehicle to collaterally attack a conviction that 
is so constitutionally flawed that it results in fundamental unfairness, and that the finality 
doctrine is not so compelling as to be more important than the vindication of one's 
constitutional rights, Id 1034-35 cited in Dunn Supra at 875-876. 
If the Court is not persuaded with the position of the Appellant being that the 
judgment of the Habeas Court be reversed and remanded with instructions based on the 
fact it did not have occasion to determine whether the case was frivolous as stated (in the 
summary of argument section of this brief) and that this Court has no reasonable basis to 
uphold the District Court's dismissal because there is no record before the Court to 
provide that basis, then it is the Appellant's position that §78-35a-107 is unconstitutional 
in violation of Utah Article one Sections Five and Eleven and U. S. Constitution Article 
1§9. 
This contention was presented to the District Court in the Appellant's response to 
the State's Motion to Dismiss which the Court apparently determined had no merit. 
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The basis for this contention is either the statue is unconstitutional because the 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus or extraordinary relief or post conviction relief by 
whatever title you choose, is a federally created cause of action or in the alternative 
§§3 of §78-3 5a-107 is vague and ambiguous because of its failure to define specific 
reasons which allow the excusing of the statue. 
The writ being akin to a 42 U.S.C. §1983 is the top of discussion but since both 
are "federally created", the cases and decisions are in context. The U.S. Supreme Court, 
in Felder-v-Casey 481 US 131 (1988) stated that "states may establish rules of procedure 
governing litigation in their own courts, by the same token, where states entertain 
federally created causes of action, the federal right cannot be defeated by local forms of 
practice." See Brown-v-Western R. Co. of Alabama 338 U.S. 294, 296, (1949) Felder Id 
at 138. 
Now, the Court must keep in mind that the basic difference of a §1983 from a 
habeas corpus is that the purpose of a habeas is to challenge basically the length of 
confinement, which is the main difference between the two. Both are methods of 
attacking violations of civil rights, but a §1983 cannot be used to attack the length of a 
sentence. 
A writ under federal law, 28 U.S.C. §2254 does not have a specified or specific 
time limit of which to file, as of the filing of the Appellants Petition. (If a time limit has 
been imposed under federal law, it could not be retro-active in this instance anyway and 
is unknown. 
The Felder Court went on to say that under the supremacy clause (Article 6 Sec. 
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2) of the Federal Constitution, the relative importance to the State of its own law is not 
material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law for any state law however 
clearly within a state's acknowledged power which interferes with or is contrary to 
federal law, must yield." Free-v-Bland 369 U.S. 663.666 (1962): Felder Td at 138. Such 
is the case the Appellant has shown flagrant violations of his rights, has filed a Petition, 
which under Article 1§5 and 11 and Article 1 §9 of the U.S. Constitution, he by law 
should be able to prosecute but the State has erected an impassable barrier for him, a law, 
contrary to and written in opposition, to the constitution. Further, the Appellant has made 
claims of factual innocence which, if proven, would entitle him to relief. The record 
supports his claims explicitly, thus was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, Townsend-v-
Sain 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963) and waiver of the Statue of Limitations under §§3. 
Under the "Continuing Wrong" doctrine a Statue of Limitations is a legal 
impossibility, "each day a gate obstructed free use of their easement, Plaintiffs obtained a 
new cause of action Shors-v-Branch 720 P2d 239, 243-44 (Mont. 1986)"; "where the 
challenged violation is a continuing one, the staleness concern disappears, Havens Realty 
Corp.-v-Coleman 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982)." 
Courts have applied the continuing wrong theory in a variety of contexts, 
particularly where civil rights are at stake, See Havens Realty Corp. Id at 380-81; "under 
the continuing wrong theory, so long as one discriminatory act falls within limitation time 
period, even acts occurring outside limitation period are not time barred." (Emphasis 
added) 
This Court said in Becton Dickinson & Co.-v-Reese 668 P2d 1254, 1257 (UT 
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1983) a cause of action accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action. So what we have is "where a continuous chain of events or 
course of conduct is involved the cause of action accrues at the time of the final act in that 
series of events or course of conduct," See Barbaccia-v-Co. of Santa Clara 451 F. Supp. 
260, 266 (N.D.Cal 1978). 
The Appellant has been continually incarcerated since 1989, so the series of 
events of course of conduct will not cease until he is released, so a Statue of Limitations 
barring him from filing a Petition is a statue in opposition to the Constitution, contrary to 
the principles and purposes for the Petition and contrary to the continuing wrong theory 
and its supporting authority, thus is contrary to the fundamental principles of Article 1§9. 
§78-35a-107 is unconstitutional and must be declared so. Appellant has established good 
cause if this issue is considered to be raised first time on appeal. 
§78-35a-107 conflicts with Article 1 §9 of the U.S. Constitution, Article 1 §5 and 
11 of Utah's declaration of rights. If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must 
decide the operation of each. Article 1§9 and Article 1§5 both guarantee that the 
privilege of writ of habeas corpus will not be suspended unless in case of rebellion or 
invasion. The public safety may require it. 
Article 1§1L Utah's open courts clause guarantees that no one shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or Counsel, 
any civil cause in which he is a party. See the text of each provision Addendum 3. The 
U.S. Supreme Court discussed this very subject in Marbury-v-Madison 5 U.S. 137; 1 
cranch 137,178 (1803). The Court said that 
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"so if a law be in opposition to the Constitution: If both the 
law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so the 
Court must either decide that case conformably to the law, 
disregarding the Constitution or conformably to the 
Constitution, disregarding the law: The Court must 
determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. 
This is of the very essence of judicial duty. 
If then the Courts are to regard the Constitution; and the 
Constitution is superior to an ordinary act of the legislature; 
the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the 
case to which both apply. 
Those then who controvert the principle that the Constitution 
is to be considered, in Court, as a paramount law, are 
reduced to the necessity of maintaining that the Courts must 
close their eyes on the Constitution and see only the law. 
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all 
written constitutions. It would declare that an act, which, 
according to the principles and theory of our government, is 
entirely void, is yet, in practice, completely obligatory. It 
would declare, that if the Legislature shall do what is 
expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express 
prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the 
legislature a practical and real omnipotence with the same 
breath which professes to restrict their powers within 
narrow limits. It is prescribing limits and declaring that 
those limits may be passed at pleasure". 
The Supreme Court concluded that a law repugaant to the Constitution is void and 
that Courts as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. So it is clear that 
placing a time limit or enacting a Statue of Limitations is in direct conflict with the State 
and Federal Constitutions. Since §78-3 5a-107 reads as it does, if the cause of action 
accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action as 
defined in this Court's decision in Becton Dickinson & Co. Id 1257, and since the 
continuing wrong doctrine is used primarily where civil rights are at stake, Havens Realty 
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Corp. Id 380-81, then assuming that the Appellant's substantive claims of ineffective 
assistance of Counsel, conflict of interest and due process under both State and Federal 
Constitutions are factually true and legally cognizable, Appellant's daily confinement is a 
continuing wrong because it is based on a convection in violation of his civil rights. 
As Judge Orem said in Currier "because the last act necessary to complete a 
habeas cause of action is illegal confinement and illegal confinement is a continuing 
wrong, the then three month Statue of Limitation but now the provision is §78-35a-
107(2)(e) did not commence at the time a certain affidavit was filed or a particular motion 
denied, but starts anew each day Petitioner is illegally confined." This applies to the 
Appellant who has the right to prosecute a Petition, and he was wrongfully denied this 
right. This issue establishes exceptional circumstances and good cause to raise this issue 
if considered a first time issue raised on appeal. 
§78-35a-107(2)(e) is a refined §78-12-31.1. The difference is largely in that §78-
3 5a-107 allows one year to file, thus in light of what was previously discussed 
unconstitutional and contrary to the principles of the Constitution and purpose of the writ. 
The Plaintiff was wrongfully denied the right to defend his cause guaranteed by 
Article 1§5 and 11, and Article 1§9 of the federal constitutional guarantee to pursue a 
writ of habeas corpus, especially in light of the fact that his claims alleged therein were 
well supported, grounded in fact, and such would entitle him to relief. These claims are 
explained in detail in Argument Two of this brief. 
So since it is clear that §78-351-107(2)(a)-(e) is not constitutionally permissible, 
then it is impossible to determine when he should have known of the evidentiary facts on 
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which the Petition is based if a cause of action accrues "upon the happening of the last 
event necessary to complete the cause of action." The statue defeats itself. If this court 
defined the phrase "cause of action accrues" correctly in Becton Dickinson & Co. Supra 
and since the U.S. Supreme Court in Havens Realty Corp. Supra stated that the 
continuing wrong theory is used primarily when civil rights are at stake, as is in this case, 
under these theories and ones cited previously. §78-35a-107(2)(a)-(e). especially §§(e\ is 
an invalid legislative enactment because it is unconstitutional under both State and 
Federal Constitutions and violates Utah's open courts' provision under Article 1§11. 
The statue, further because of the above mentioned fact is unconstitutionally 
vague. Subsections A-d are self defined and are understandable in context to this Court's 
definition of when a cause of action accrues, but those subsections emphatically cannot 
apply to the instant action, only §§e' could possibly apply if the Court doesn't declare the 
statue as a whole unconstitutional. 
In light of this Court's definition of when a cause of action occurs and §§e' which 
states the date on which the Petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the Petition is based, the date could be 
any date, but since the Court failed to hold a hearing, it was not in a position to determine 
if there were grounds to excuse the statue based on §3, or whether subsection £§e, one 
year time span had in fact run out. 
"A statue is ambiguous if it can be understood by reasonably well-informed 
persons to have different meanings, Tanner-v-Phoenix Ins. Co. 779 P2d 231, 233 (UT 
App. 1990). When a criminal law is NOT sufficiently clear, it is voided by due process 
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because of their vagueness. U.S.-v-Ullgses-SaLazar 28 F3d 932 (9th Cir 1994). 
Therefore since the Court failed to conduct a hearing as mentioned above, the fact 
that the statue is vague and ambiguous. "Any ambiguity that may exist should be 
resolved in favor of a criminal defendant", Smith-v-Cook 803 P2d 788, 791 (UT 1990). 
Since the Appellant has raised two issues involving the constitutionality of the 
statue, "strict scrutiny" must be applied to determine the constitutionality of a statue 
which burdens the exercise of a fundamental right, US-v-Johnson 40 F3d 436 (D.C.Cir 
1994). 
Appellant requests that this Court conduct a comprehensive review of this claim 
since, to his knowledge, no known case law or guidance of this newly enacted statue 
exists for him or the lower courts to review. 
- ARGUMENT TWO -
"The District Court erred in not letting the Appellant proceed 
with his ineffective assistance of Counsel and conflict of 
interest claims on his Appellant Counsel when this issue 
established "good cause" and "unusual circumstances" to 
rehash some issues raised on appeal and factually supported 
the request for relief on the grounds of plain error." 
A District Court has an affirmative duty to initiate an inquiry into a conflict of 
interest situation if it knows or reasonably should know that a potential conflict exists. 
When the Trial Court has notice of a potential conflict but fails to make such an inquiry, 
the reviewing Court will presume a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to Counsel. 
See IJ.S.-v- Cook 45 F3d 388, 393-94 (10th Cir 1994); Hollowav-v-Arkansas 435 U.S. 
475,484-85(1978). 
-15-
In the instant case Appellant's Counsel, Alan Jeppeson, withdrew from his case 
on or about 9/20/89 because of a conflict of interest. After an unsuccessful trial with 
retained Counsel, the Appellant became indigent and could not afford to hire Counsel or 
keep his retained Counsel for the purpose of appeal. Appellant's retained Counsel 
withdrew and the Court appointed Mr. Jeppeson again for the purpose of appeal and 
knowing a conflict existed. An objection was entered and the Court stated that it would 
review the matter at a later date but never did. This failure of the Court constitutes plain 
error. 
Appellant proceeded with his first appeal of right with his Counsel who was 
operating under conflict of interest. A Sixth Amendment claim grounded on conflict of 
interest, like that in this case, should be analyzed in the same fashion as a Sixth 
Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of Trial Counsel. Euitts-v-Lucey 469 U.S. 
396(1985). 
Further the prevailing professional and ethical standards are applicable to this 
case. Rule 1.7(b), Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, states in relevant part: "A lawyer 
shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by 
. . . . the lawyer's own interest, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) each client consents after 
consultation." In this case the lawyer's representation was adversely affected and the 
Appellant didn't consent to the representation. He objected. 
A^ The predominate point raised as reversible error in the Petition was the Trial 
Court's duty to inquire into a conflict situation, since it knew of the conflict situation 
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even before it re-appointed Counsel again to the case for the first appeal of right, after, 
also a timely objection on the issue. 
At the point the risk of conflict of interest is brought to the Trial Court's attention, 
"the Court has the responsibility to investigate further, to advise the defendant personally, 
and to receive a knowing waiver if that is the express wish of the defendant." See U.S.-v-
Tatum 943 F2d 370, 379 (4th Cir 1991). There was no waiver on the part of the Appellant 
to proceed with Counsel, only an objection. It was the Appellant who fired him shortly 
after he was appointed, "upon the Trial Court rests the duty of seeing that the trial is 
conducted with solicitude for the essential rights of the accused..." Holloway at 484 
quoting Glasser-v-U.S. 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942). 
In Wood-v-Georgia 450 U.S. 261 (1981), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
conflict situation which is not addressed by the Trial Court requires reversal: "Sullivan 
mandates a reversal when the Trial Court has failed to make an inquiry even though it 
"knows , or reasonably should know, a particular conflict exists." Id at 272 n.18 (quoting 
Cuyler-v-Sullivan 446 U.S. 347. 
Similarly, when a conflict situation becomes apparent to the State, "it has a duty 
to bring the issue to the Court's attention and, if necessary, move for disqualification of 
Counsel." Tatum 943 F2d at 379-80 cf. U.S.-v-Agurs 427 U.S. 97,110-11 (1976). 
This conflict situation was arguably raised to the Trial Court. This conflict 
situation was raised to the Habeas Court in the Petition, supported by documentation and 
the Habeas Court must have seen merit because it appointed Counsel. See Petition 
Addendum 4. 
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, the failure of the Trial Court to address the 
circumstances of the conflict issue requires reversal in as much as the Trial Court knew or 
reasonably should have known of the particular conflict of interest between the Appellant 
and Counsel. Further the Habeas Court abused its discretion in declining to hear the issue 
and failing to have an evidentiary hearing on these questions of fact adequately and 
arguably supported in the record, and because good cause and exceptional circumstances 
are present to warrant review as well as plain error. Further the State failed in its duty, 
whether it be the County Prosecutors of the State Attorney General's office which served 
the same documents as the Habeas Court, to bring this well documented conflict of 
interest situation to the Court. This constitutes plain error. 
It is the Appellant's position that the Trial Court committed plain error as 
discussed above and that the Habeas Court committed plain error by failing in its duty to 
protect the inalienable rights of the Appellant because it was in the position to remedy the 
Sixth Amendment violation and the due process violation by either vacating the 
conviction and ordering a new trial; entering a Nunc Protunc Judgment so Appellant 
could appeal; or any other relief it deemed appropriate. See Hammershoy-v-
Commonwealth 398 S.W 2d 883 (1966); U.S.-v-Winterhalder 724 Fed 109 (10th Cir 
1983)(per curiam (discussing remedies). 
R The Utah Court of Appeals in affirming Appellant's conviction when his 
attorney, who he had a conflict of interest with, filed a Anders' brief which failed to 
purport to this Court's construction requirements, done so violating the Appellant's rights 
to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Euitts-v-Lucey 469 U.S. 385-401 
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(1985). The Habeas Court was also in a position to correct this and failed in its judicial 
duty, which the interest of justice required this issue as well as the one stated above, to be 
vindicated, thus abusing its discretion in dismissing the Petition. This brief was filed 
against Brown's desires. 
The Anders' brief raised several individualized issues but did not have a 
particularized argument for each issue nor has law cited for each issue. See U.R.A.P. 
Rule 24faY9V 
No argument was articulated which demonstrated that each issue was in fact 
frivolous. Dunn Id 878. But instead, there was one large statement of fact or summary of 
argument that failed to particularize any one argument. Nor were there legal citations 
cited for each particular issue raised. There was no analysis of the record or case law for 
a Court to secure in belief that the issues were in fact frivolous. See Dunn Id 878. But 
instead, Counsel briefed the case in favor of the government. Appellant was deprived of 
effective assistance of appellate Counsel. 
In Robinson-v-Black 812 F2d 1084,1086-87 (8th Cir 1987). The Court said that; 
"Counsel did not act as an advocate for Robinson when he 
briefed all issues in favor of the government and concluded 
Robinson's claims were meritless. Robinson had a right to 
expect Counsel to brief and argue his case to the best of 
Counsel's ability, showing the most favorable side of 
defendant's arguments. Counsel changed the adversial 
process into an inquisitorial one by joining the forces of the 
State and working against his client." 
It is not enough to list issues and case citations; the arguments must be 
sufficiently articulated to justify the conclusion that Counsel has truly sought to present 
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meritorious issues but cannot. Penson-v-Ohio 488 U.S. 75 (1988) cited in Dunn Id 877. 
So the Anders' brief filed in Brown's case, like Dunn's, violates the, Penson and 
Clayton requirements in at least two ways, and the conclusion must be the same, that 
Brown was denied effective assistance of Counsel. A prior appeal is not a bar to the 
Habeas proceedings and that the case must be remanded as it was in Dunn for 
proceedings on the merits of the Petition. 
So because of the conflict of interest, Jeppeson should have never been re-
appointed. The conflict began when Jeppeson came to Brown shortly after he was 
appointed wanting to know if he would take a plea bargain. Brown said "No". Jeppeson 
threatened to withdraw stating he believed Brown was guilty and that he would be found 
guilty at trial. Brown fired Counsel. This scenario is in contrast with the scenario in 
U.S.-v-Wilson 922 F2d 1336 (7th Cir 1991) and the principles that that case was 
established on. See Brief Addendum 5. 
Further, Counsel who operates under the belief that his client should be convicted, 
fails to function in any meaningful sense as the government adversary, Osborn-v-
Shillinger 861 F2d 612, 625 (10th Cir 1988)(quoting U.S.-v-Cronic 466 U.S. 666 (1984)). 
The whole fact of Jeppeson's re-appointment was highly prejudicial to Brown violating 
his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of Appellate's Counsel and to have 
representation free from conflict and this type of conflict representation derives from the 
Sixth Amendment as applied to the states by the due process clause of the 14th 
Amendment, Garcua-v-Bunnell 33 F3d 1193 (9th Cir 1994). This establishes good cause 
and exceptional circumstances for review and supports the plain error claim made earlier 
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in this brief. 
Counsel is obligated to meticulously review the record in any case in which he 
challenges a District Court's disposition, Hirsch-v-Burke 40 F3d 900 (7th Cir 1994); 
Battle-v-Delo 19 F3d 1547 (8th Cir 1994). 
The Anders' brief was filed against Brown's wishes. He knew he had several 
claims which would support a conclusion of reversible error. The two strongest being a 
lack of evidence to support the conviction who was admitted by the State in the State's 
interlocutory appeal to this Court and even if the evidence was sufficient, it could only 
support a manslaughter conviction based on the heat of passion theory or emotional 
disturbance theory since the victim of the crime was Brown's wife. These were strongly 
arguable issues. 
There is several other issues such as search and seizure, police brutality, Trial 
Court errors in failing to grant a new trial and issues pertaining to the jury that were 
arguable also. 
But because of Counsel's conflict, he failed to meticulously review the record, 
failed to articulate argument to demonstrate each one frivolous, or objectively 
demonstrate each one frivolous, failed to analyze the record and legal citations to the 
point where the Court could be properly assured that Counsel engaged in sufficient 
analysis of the record and case law to secure in belief that the issues are frivolous. And 
Counsel should have addressed the issues raised herein to the extent that they were 
arguable. The Sixth Amendment requires automatic reversal when a Trial Court fails to 
conduct an inquiry after a timely objection, U.S.-v-Burney 756 F2d 787, 791 (10th 
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merits of th on the e Petition. 
- CONCLUSION -
It is the Appellant's position that this case should be reversed and remanded for 
proceedings on the merits of the Petition, that §78-3 5a-107 et seq should be declared 
unconstitutional or because of the conflict of interest shown in the record, that he be 
granted an outright reversal, or be granted a Nunc Pro Tunc Judgment so that he may file 
a new motion for new trial to raise trial errors and have a First Appeal of Right properly 
filed or any relief this Court deems just and proper in this case. 
DATED this / ^ day of January, 1997. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I have mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to the party listed 
below on this 13th day of January 1997. 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
Appeals Division 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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ALAN K. JEPPESEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
85 North Main Street 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
Telephone: (801) 882-2444 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, TOOELE CITY DEPARTMENT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOTY LYN BROWN,aka 
Jack Brown, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL 
OF COUNSEL 
Civil No . fff7^ 3/f 
Notice is hereby given that Alan K.- Jeppesen does withdraw 
as counsel for Defendant, 
Dated this y& day of September, 1989. 
*1^<£<A 
Alan K. Je 
Attorney a 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the £cV"-£ day of September, 1989, 
I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel to Ronald L. Elton, 
Tooele County Attorney, 47 South Main Street, Tooele, Utah 84 074 
and Paul Gotay, 11583 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
K 
" i , 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs 
BROWN, DOTY LYN 
PLAINTIFF, 
DEFENDANT. 
CASE NUMBER 89L300077 FS 
DATE MARCH 12, 1990 
JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO 
COURT REPORTER WILSON, CECILEE 
COURT CLERK RGB 
ATP ELTON, RONALD PRESENT 
ATD GOTAY, PAUL PRESENT 
THIS MATTER COMES NOW BEFORE THE COURT FOR SENTENCING AND FOR 
HEARING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO ARREST VERDICT. MR. GOTAY MAKES 
STATEMENTS IN BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT IN REGARDS TO THE PRE-
SENTENCE REPORT AND THE WORDING OF THE SAME. MR. ELTON RESPONDS 
COURT NOW BEING ADVISED IN THE PREMISES SENTENCES THE DEFENDANT 
AS FOLLOWS: 5-YRS TO LIFE IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON SUCH 
SENTENCE TO RUN CONCURRENT WITH ANY OTHER SENTENCE-$5000.00 FINE 
+25% SURCHARGE RESTITUTION TO VICTIMS FAMILY FOR BURIAL. COURT 
NOW HEARS ARGUMENTS REGARDING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO ARREST 
JUDGMENT,MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL-COURT DENIES BOTH MOTIONS. 
MR. GOTAY INDICATES TO THE COURT THAT A WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL IS 
FILED WITH THE COURT AND THAT A PUBLIC DEFENDER BE APPOINTED THE 
DEFENDANT. COURT NOW FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT IS INDIGENT AND 
THAT THE PRESENT COUNSEL, GOTAY HAS FILED A NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
ALAN K. JEPPESEN HAS BEEN APPOINTED COUNSEL FOR THE PRESENT AND 
FURTHER ACTION ON APPOINTMENT OF OTHER COUNSEL MAY BE CONSIDERED 
ON MOTION OF THE DEFENDANT. 
00022 
Paul Gotay (1224) 
Gotay Law Office 
Attorney for Defendant 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: 801-265-2833 
fiEnr. OF Hi? COURT 
' 1930 HAR 12 AM 11= 10 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOTY LYN BROWN 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL 
Case No. 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Comes now, Paul Gotay, attorney for the defendant, DOTY 
LYN BROWN, and withdraws from representing s^ jld defendant. 
DATED this XL> day of lAojfe^/A /
 A 1990. 
>AUL GOT 
Attorney^ or Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
lereby certify that on this XIS day of \AJS^L>^J\ , 
1990, I mailed-a true and correct copy, postage prepaid, of 
I hereto 
the foregoing Notice of Withdrawal to Ronald ELton, Tooele 
County Attqrney, Tooele County Courthouse, 47,/South Main Street, 
Tooele, Utah 84074. 
PAUITGOTAY 
Attorney at Law c\ fi f\ £*£ X 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
March 21, 1990 
t> 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
CLERK CI" " i ' r C f 
1590 MR 2 3 >•:•) 
-pcm^'-n-. 
SHARON CALLISTER 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
47 SOUTH MAIN 
TOOELE, UTAH 84074 
t 
The State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Doty Lyn Brown, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 900127 
891300077 
This day Notice of Appeal filed, 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
ADDENDUM 11 
Enrolled Copy S.B. 30 
Corrected Version 
POSTCONVICTION STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS 
1995 GENERAL SESSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
Sponsor: Robert C. Steiner 
AN ACT RELATING TO JUDICIAL CODE; REPEALING AND REENACTING PROVISIONS 
ON THE POSTCONVICTION RELIEF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 1953 as follows: 
REPEALS AND REENACTS: 
78-12-31.1, as enacted by Chapter 133, Laws of Utah 1979 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 78-12-31.1 is repealed and reenacted to read: 
78-12-31.1. Postconviction relief statute of limitations. 
(U A petitioner is entitled to relief pursuant to Rule 65BftO. Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, only if the petition is filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action in a petition for postconviction relief 
pursuant to Rule 65Bfb'i. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, accrues on the latest of the following 
dates; 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction, if 
no appeal i? taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has Jurisdiction over the case, if 
an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last dav for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court or the 
United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed: 
(d^ l the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the decision 
on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is filed: or 
ie) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable 
S.B. 30 Enrolled Copy 
diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based. 
(3) These time limitations do not apply to a petitioner's claims: 
(z\ that his sentence has expired: or 
(b) that the committing court acted outside of its jurisdiction when it enteredthe conviction. 
(4) If the court finds that the interests of iustice require, a court mav excuse a petitioner's 
failure to file within the time limitations. 
(5) This section does not apply to motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22. Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
2-
ADDENDUM 111 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
PREAMBLE 
Article 
I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
V. 
VI. 
VII. 
VIII. 
IX. 
X. 
XI. 
XII. 
XIII. 
XIV. 
XV. 
XVI. 
XVII. 
XVIII. 
XIX. 
XX. 
XXI. 
XXII. 
XXIII. 
XXIV. 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
STATE BOUNDARIES 
ORDINANCE 
ELECTIONS AND RIGHT OF SUF-
FRAGE 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 
CONGRESSIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE 
APPORTIONMENT 
EDUCATION 
COUNTIES, CITIES AND TOWNS 
CORPORATIONS 
REVENUE AND TAXATION 
PUBLIC DEBT 
MILITIA 
LABOR 
WATER RIGHTS 
FORESTRY 
PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND STATE 
INSTITUTIONS 
PUBLIC LANDS 
SALARIES 
MISCELLANEOUS 
AMENDMENT AND REVISION 
SCHEDULE 
PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, 
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate 
the principles of free government, do ordain and es-
tablish this CONSTITUTION. 1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS 
Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to 
vote or hold office.] 
5. [Habeas corpus.] 
6. [Right to bear arms.] 
7. [Due process of law.] 
8. [Offenses bailable.] 
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
10. [Trial by jury.] 
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
16. jNo imprisonment for debt — Exception.) 
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts. 1 
19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
• / • 
Section 
21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
22. [Private property for public use.] 
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
• 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
25. [Rights retained by people.] 
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
27.. [Fundamental rights.] 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to 
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, 
possess and protect property; to worship according to 
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peace-
ably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress 
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts 
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right. 1896 
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the peo-
ple.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all 
free governments are founded on their authority for 
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the 
right to alter or reform their government as the pub-
lic welfare may require. 1896 
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the 
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United 
States is the supreme law of the land. 1896 
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — No property qualifi-
cation to vote or hold office.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. 
The State shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a quali-
fication for any office of public trust or for any vote at 
any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as 
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church 
and State, nor shall anv church dominate the State or 
interfere with its functions. No public money or prop-
erty shall be appropriated for or applied to any reli-
gious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the sup-
port of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property 
qualification shall be required of any person to vote, 
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 
1896 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, 
the public safety requires it. 1896 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear 
arms for security and defense of self, family, others, 
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful pur-
poses shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall 
prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use 
of arms. 1985 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law. 1896 
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bail-
able except: 
433 
Art. I, § 9 "V CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 434 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense, 
when there is substantial evidence to support the 
charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on pro-
bation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting 
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is 
substantial evidence to support the new felony 
charge; or 
(c) persons charged with a crime, as defined by 
statute, when there is substantial evidence to 
support the charge and the court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that the person wouM 
constitute a substantial danger to self or any 
other person or to the community or is likely to 
flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on 
bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pend-
ing appeal only as prescribed by law 1989 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fun s — Cruel pun-
ishments.} 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines 
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or impris-
oned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall re-
main inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, ex-
cept in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight ju-
rors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall con-
sist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall 
be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the ju-
rors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded. 1896 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
party. 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to be confronted by the wit nesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
1896 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indict-
ment — Grand jury.l 
Offenses heretofore required to bp prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by magistrate, un-
less the examination be waived b *he accused with 
the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or 
without such examination and commitment. The for-
mation of the grand jury and the powers and duties 
thereof shajl be ' a s prescribed by the Legislature. 
1949 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — 
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 1896 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — 
Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press. In all criminal pros-
ecutions for libel the t ruth may be given in evidence 
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the 
matter charged as libelous is true, and was published 
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party 
shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Excep-
tion.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in 
cases of absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or 
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the 
free exercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time 
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the 
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law. 
1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Im-
pairing contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law im-
pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 
1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in 
levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies 
or in giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be 
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two 
witnesses to the same overt act. 1896 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil 
power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the 
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be 
quartered in any house without the consent of the 
owner; nor in time of war except in a manner to be 
prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within this 
State. 1896 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation. 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any 
franchise, privilege or immunity. 1896 
427 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES Art. VII 
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Ef-
fect thereof. 
Sec. 2. [Privileges and immunities — Fugitives 
from justice and service.] 
[1.] The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to 
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the sev* 
eral States. 
[2.] A person charged in any State with Treason, 
Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, 
and be found in another State, shall on Demand of 
the executive Authority of the State from which he 
fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State hav-
ing Jurisdiction of the Crime. 
[3.] No Person held to Service or Labour in one 
State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, 
shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation 
therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, 
but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to 
whom such Service or Labour may be due. 
Sec. 3. [Admission of states — Rules and regu-
lations respecting the territory and 
property of the United States.] 
[1.] New States may be admitted by the Congress 
into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or 
erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor 
any State be formed by the Junction of two or more 
States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the 
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the 
Congress. 
[2.] The Congress shall have Power to dispose of 
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respect-
ing the Territory or other Property belonging to the 
United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall 
be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the 
United States, or of any particular State. 
Sec. 4. [Guaranty of republican form of govern-
ment and against invasion.] 
The United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and 
shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on 
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive 
(when the Legislature cannot be convened) against 
domestic Violence. 
ARTICLE V 
[AMENDMENT] 
[Mode of amendment.] 
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses 
shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments 
to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Leg-
islatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call 
a Convention for proposing -Amendments, which, in 
either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Pur-
poses, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by 
the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several 
States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as 
the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be pro-
posed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment 
which may be made prior to the Year One thousand 
eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect 
the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of 
the first Article; and that no State, without its Con-
sent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the 
Senate. 
ARTICLE VI 
[MISCELLANEOUS 
PROVISIONS] 
[Assumption of public debt — Supreme Law — 
Oath of office — Religious tests prohib-
ited.] 
[1.] All Debts contracted and Engagements entered 
into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be 
as valid against the United States under this Consti-
tution, as under the Confederation. 
*"""[2.] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and 
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
[3.] The Senators and Representatives before men-
tioned, and the Members of the several State Legisla-
tures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of 
the United States and of the several States, shall be 
bound by Oath or Affirmation to support this Consti-
tution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as 
a qualification to any Office or public Trust under the 
United States. 
ARTICLE VII 
[ADOPTION] 
[Ratification — Attestation.] 
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, 
shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Con-
stitution between the States so ratifying the same. 
Done in Convention by the unanimous consent of the 
states present the seventeenth day of September in 
the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and 
eighty seven, and of the independence of the United 
States of America the twelfth. 
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AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the se-
curity of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in 
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in 
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial, by jury in civil cases.] 
' In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
[Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial 
power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of President and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, 
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, 
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of 
the same state with themselves; they shall name in 
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in 
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-Presi-
dent, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons 
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, 
which lists they shall sign and certify, and t ransmit 
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United 
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The 
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The 
person having the greatest number of votes for Presi-
dent, shall be the President, if such number be a ma-
jority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and 
if no person have such majority, then from the per-
sons having the highest numbers not exceeding three 
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on the list of those voted for as President, the House 
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by bal-
lot, the President. But in choosing the President, the 
votes shall be taken by states, the representation 
from each state having one vote; a quorum for this 
purpose shall consist of a member or members from 
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the 
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House 
of Representatives shall not choose a President when-
ever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, be-
fore the fourth day of March next following, then the 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of 
the death or other constitutional disability of the 
President.—The person having the greatest number 
of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-Presi-
dent, if such number be a majority of the whole num-
ber of Electors appointed, and if no person have a 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the 
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a 
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of 
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the 
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no 
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of Pres-
ident shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the 
United States. 
AMENDMENT XIII 
Section 
1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdic-
tion. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protec-
tion.] 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be 
paid.] 
5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — 
Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No $tate shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States: nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec, 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap-
pointment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the 
several States according to their respective numbers, 
counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to 
x 
vote at any election for the choice of electors for Presi-
dent and Vice-President of the United States, Repre-
sentatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial 
Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of 
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citi-
zens of the United States, or in any way abridged, 
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, 
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in 
the proportion which the number of such male citi-
zens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or Elector of President and Vice President, 
or hold any office, civil or military, under the United 
States, or under any State, who, having previously 
taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an 
officer of the United States, or as a member of any 
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer 
of any State, to support the Constitution of the 
United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or 
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to 
the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of 
two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — 
Debts of the Confederacy and claims 
not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for pay-
ment of pensions and bounties for services in sup-
pressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be ques-
tioned. But neither the United States nor any State 
shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred 
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of 
any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims 
shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.J 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
•AMENDMENT XV 
Section 
1. [Right of citizens to vote 
disqualify.] 
2. (Power to enforce amendment.] 
Race or color not to 
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or 
color not to disqualify.] 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States 
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce this arti-
cle by appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XVI 
[Income tax.] 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, 
without apportionment among the several States, 
and without regard to any census or enumeration. 
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The procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for ex-
traordinary relief. To the extent that this rule does not provide special proce-
dures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by 
the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules, 
(b) Wrongful imprisonment. t. 
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to imprisonment in a state 
prison, other correctional facility or county jail who asserts that the com-] 
mitment resulted from a substantial denial of rights may petition the* 
court for relief under this paragraph. This paragraph (b) shall govern 
proceedings based on claims relating to original commitments and com-, 
mitments for violation of probation or parole. This paragraph (b) shall not 
govern proceedings based on claims relating to the terms or conditions of 
confinement. 
(2) Commencemen t Except for challenges to parole violation proceed-
ings, the proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition, together 
with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the district court in the county in 
which the commitment leading to confinement was issued. The court may 
order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the 
parties or witnesses. Petitions challenging parole violation proceedings 
shall be commenced by filing a petition together with a copy thereof, with 
the clerk of the district court in the county in which the petitioner is 
located. 
(3) Contents of the petit ion. The petition shall set forth all claims 
that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the commitment. 
Additional claims relating to the legality of the commitment may not be 
raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The peti-
tion shall state: 
(A) the place where the petitioner is restrained; 
(B) the name of the court by which the petitioner was convicted 
and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction 
was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceed-
ings, if known by the petitioner, 
(C) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis of which 
the petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as the result of 
the commitment; 
(D) whether or not the judgment of conviction or the commitment 
for violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal, and, 
if so, the number and caption or title of the appellate proceeding and 
the results of the review; 
(E) whether the legality of the commitment has already been adju-
dicated in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and if so 
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding. 
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach to the 
petition affidavits, copies of records or other evidence available to the 
petitioner in support of the allegations. The petitioner shall also attach to 
the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior 
post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of 
the commitment, and a copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If 
copies of pertinent pleadings, orders, and memoranda are not attached, 
the petition shall state why they are not attached. 
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth 
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may 
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed 
with the petition. 
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On the filing of the petition, 
the clerk shall promptly deliver it to the assigned judge of the court in 
which it is filed. Except for challenges to parole violation proreedin^s, the 
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presiding judge shall if possible assign the proceeding to the judge who 
issued the commitment. 
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is 
apparent to the court that the issues presented in the petition have al-
- ready been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason 
any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall 
••: forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is 
} r frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. j j Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of 
.„' dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclu-
{v sions of law. 
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court con-
^a. eludes that all or part of the petition is not frivolous on its face, the court 
t t^" shall designate the portions of the petition that are not frivolous and 
direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any memoran-
dum by mail upon the attorney general and the county attorney. 
(9) Responsive pleading. Within twenty days (plus time allowed un-
*• -^ der these rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition 
upon the attorney general and county attorney, or within such other 
period of time as the court may allow, the attorney general or county 
attorney shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition 
that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response 
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within twenty days 
(plus time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memo-
j randum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be per-
£t mitted unless ordered by the court. 
,. (10) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set 
***. the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise disppse of the case. Upon motion 
for good cause, the court may grant leave to either party to take discovery 
u or to extend the date for the hearing. Prior to the hearing, the court may 
order either the petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant 
transcript or court records. The court may also order a prehearing confer-
ence, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the 
hearing on the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall be present 
before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise 
be present in court during the proceeding. 
(11) Orders. If the court rules in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter 
an appropriate order with respect to the validity of the challenged com-
mitment and with respect to rearraignment, retrial, resentencing, cus-
tody, bail or discharge. The court shall enter findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, as appropriate, following any evidentiary hearing or any 
hearing on a dispositive motion. Upon application of the attorney general 
or the county attorney, or upon its own motion, the court may stay release 
of the petitioner pending appeal of its order. 
(12) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as al-
lowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the 
petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the petitioner may 
proceed upon an affidavit of impecuniosity, in which event the court may 
direct that the costs be paid by the county in which the complainant was 
originally charged. 
(13) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition 
may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme 
Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those 
courts. 
(c) Other wrongful res t ra ints on personal liberty. 
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by paragraph (b) of this rule, 
this paragraph (c) shall govern all petitions claiming that a person has^ 
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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
DOTY LYN BROWN, 
Defendant 
PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO 
FILE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
Case No. 891300077 
* * * * * * * * 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2-2(3)(h), which gives the Utah Supreme 
Court jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a First degree felony; and pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 77-35-26(3)(e) which allows 
an appeal from an order of a court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence; and 
pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Supreme Court governing discretionary appeals from 
interlocutory orders, the State of Utah hereby petitions the Supreme Court for permission to 
appeal from the Interlocutor)' Order dated February 12, 1990, and signed by the Honorable 
Raymond S. Uno a copy of which Order is included herewith. Petitioner alleges as follows: 
1, That on or about December 7, 1989, the preliminary hearing was held in the 
above-named matter in which the Defendant was bound over to the Third District Court for 
trial on charges of Second Degree Murder, a First Degree Felony. That upon hearing the 
testimony offered at the preliminary hearing, the attorneys for the State of Utah determined 
that the State needed an additional firearms identification witness for use at trial. 
2. That the State submitted the physical evidence to Mr. John O'Neil, an employee 
of the Federal Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agency for firearms identification analysis. 
3. That on January 17, 1990, counsel for the State submitted a list of potential 
witnesses to be used at trial to attorney for the defendant, Paul Gotay, and that t^- n f l me John 
O'Neil was included in the list of potential witnesses. 
4. That counsel for the State orally communicated to Mr. Gotay that the State was 
having the firearms evidence analyzed by an additional witness and that results of the analysis 
would be provided to defense counsel as soon as they were received by the State. 
5. That on or about February 2, 1990, Mr. O'Neil communicated to the State by 
telephone the result of his analysis indicating that all three bullet fragments which were 
submitted were positively identified as having been fired from the murder weapon. 
6. That on that same date, counsel for the State, John K. West, teleohoned Mr. 
Paul Gotay and orally gave him the results communicated by Mr. O'Neil. 
7. That on the afternoon of February 8, 1990, counsel for the State received in the 
mail the one-page report prepared by Mr. O'Neil summarizing his analysis that on February 
9, 1990, and that the State mailed, with a letter, a copy of that report to Mr. Gotay, attorney 
for defendant That on February 12, 1990, the State received in the mail, photographs 
prepared by Mr. O'Neil depicting some of his observation in comparing the bullet fragments. 
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8. 1 hat in every instance, the State of Utah provided to Mr. Gotay any new 
information received from Mr. O'Neil as soon as practicable after its receipt. 
9. Counsel for Defendant filed a Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Mr. John 
O'Neil and the District Court, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno presiding, granted Defendant's 
Motion on February 12, 1990. That the State urged the court that the appropriate remedy for 
any potential prejudice to the Defendant would be to continue the trial rather than to exclude 
the testimony. 
10. The question of law upon which this court must rule is whether the Defendant 
was unfairly prejudiced by not having received written reports of Mr. O'Neil's analysis at an 
earlier date and if so, whether the proper remedy for the late receipt of the written report was 
suppression of the testimony of Mr. O'Neil or a continuance of the trial date. 
11. An immediate Interlocutory Appeal should be permitted because the matter is 
set for jury trial to begin February 13, 1990, and the State deems the testimony of Mr. O'Neil 
essential to successful prosecution of the Defendant. The State's entire case is based upon 
fireanns identification and fingerprint evidence. No direct evidence of the murder will be 
introduced at trial. Accordingly, the firearms identification evidence is critical to successful 
prosecution of the State's laws. 
12. The interest of justice and the search for truth require that this essential evidence 
be given to the trier of fact. 
3 
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Accordingly, the State respectfully requests that this petition be granted in an 
expedited hearing. 
DATED this 12th day of February . 1990. 
RONALD L. ELTON 
Tooele County Attorney 
JOHN KJWEST 
Deputy TJooele Counts Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for Permission to 
File Interlocutory Appeal, Motion for Stay and Order will be hand delivered to Paul Gotay, 
at the Tooele County Courthouse on the 13th day of February . 1990. 
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In The Supreme Court of The State of Utah 
Doty Brown 
Petitioner 
-V-
State of Utah 
Respondent 
No., 
Petition For Extra Ordinary Relief 
(Pursuant to U.R.A. P. Rule 19) 
Doty Brown 
#19942 0011 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Jan Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
236 Stale Capitol 
Salt lake City, Utah 84114 
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Cuyer -v- Sullivan 446 u.s. 335 (1980) 6 
Osborn -v- Shillinger 861 F2d 612 (10th cir 1988) 6 
Rodrigezz -v- u.s. 395 u.s. 372, 332 (1969) 7 
State -v- Clayton 639 P2d 168 (Utah 1981) 7 
Strickland -v- Washington 466 u.s. 668 (1984) 6 
U.S. -v- Cronic 466 u.s. 648 (1984) 6 
U.S. -v- Winterhalder 724 F2d 109 (10th cir 1983) 7 
U.R. Crim P. Rile 30(a) 
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In The Supreme Court of The State of Utah 
Doty Brown 
Petitioner 
-V-
State of Utah 
Respondent 
No., 
Petition For Extra Ordinary Relief 
(Pursuant to U.R.A. P. Rule 19) 
Pursuant to rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Petitioner hereby files an applica-
tion for Writ of Mandamus against the above named respondents. In compliance with rule 19(b) the 
following information is offered; 
- Statement of Interested Parties -
This petition directly involves the rights of petitioner Doty Lyn Brown, as an inmate of the Utah 
State Prison. Portions of the relief sought may substantially affect the conduct of district courts, 
prosecutors, defense counsel as well as inmates presently incarcerated and the future incarceration 
of inmates. 
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Statement of Issues and Relief Sought 
The issues in the case are as follows 
1. Has the Sixth Amendment and State and Federal due process clauses been violated by the dis-
trict court knowingly reappointing counsel to petitioners case with which petitioner had an actual 
conflict of interest with and by the court committing plain error in appointing counsel to perfect the 
first appeal of right which, because of the conflict led to counsel filing an Anders Brief? 
2. Has state and Federal due process as well as the Sixth Amendment been violated by counsels 
deficient performance which led ultimately to the petitioner being constructively denied a meaningful 
first appeal of right and by the Anders/Clayton proceeding not purporting to the requirements man-
dated for this type of proceeding by this court? 
3. Was due process of the State and Federal Constitutions violated by the Court of Appeals falling 
to conduct a comprehensive review of the record to decide if it was in fact frivolous? 
This petitioner respectfully request that this court require the District Court to enter a judgement 
Nunc Pro Tunc that the petitioner may have an effective first appeal of right or for this court to 
vacate the judgement and remand the matter to the district court to enter a new one where upon an 
appeal may be taken from the new judgement. The petitioner has a right to constitutionally purport-
ed proceedings and this right by no means may be compromised. 
- Statement of Facts -
On. / W / ? h , / f f i ^ Petitioner was arrested for suspicion of second degree murder, 
before questioning petitioner was taken into a small room at the Salt Lake COunty jail. There he 
was questioned by sergeant James and Bradshaw of the Tooele County Sheriff's Office regarding 
the death of his wife, Sandra Brown, sergeant James and Bradshaw before repeatedly beating the 
petitioner while he was handcuffed behind his back, failed to read him his miranda rights. Petitioner 
between beatings, told officers several times that he wanted an attorney present before questioning. 
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Out of fear, petitioner told officers what he knew about his wife's death although the confession was 
involuntary. Petitioner was then arrested and charged with second degree murder, a violation of 
U.C. A. 76-5-203 (see exhibit l)(Affidavit of Defendant.) 
At the arraignment, Alien K. Jeppson was appointed to represent the petitioner, this date is 
unknown. A conflict of interest severed the attorney/client relationship when petitioner was told by 
Mr. Jeppson, from the beginning to take a plea bargain and this was done before any preliminary 
investigation of the case. On^^.1989, petitioner was able, through the help of family, to retain 
Paul Gotay as counsel, on September 20, 1989 counsel Jeppson notified Mr. Gotay and the County 
Attorney of his withdrawal as council, and filed the same in the Third District Court on October 5, 
1989, (see exhibit 2 ). 
On December 7,1989 a preliminary hearing was and the matter was bound over to the District 
Court. Many issues were raised during the course of the proceeding such as miranda issues and 
the motion to suppress that was granted but the court allowed it to be withdrawn after it was grant-
ed, thus committing plain error. Points further argued were lack of the lack of direct evidence. No 
evidence which directly implemented the petitioner the petitioner was ever introduced and this lack 
of direct evidence was admitted to by the State, (see exhibit 3 states request for interlocutory appeal 
at 3.). * This necessarily affects the nature of the crime the petitioner was charged with because the 
statutory elements of the offense were not proven at preliminary hearing nor during trial and legally 
could not be. If there is no direct evidence, no intent can be proven. 
During the trial several female jurors were in the restroom and a spectator, Mrs Walker ques-
tioned the petitioners mother about the petitioner, in front of other lady jurors. Although the jury was 
interrogated, the court committed manifested error in not declaring a mistrial based on inproprity of 
the jury, and impanelled a new jury to hear the case. 
On February 17, 1990, petitioner was found guilty of second degree murder, (see exhibit 4 .). 
On or about February27, 1990. the counsel of the petitioner filed a motion of arrest of judgement/or 
new trial alleging lack of evidence to support a conviction of second degree murder. It was councils 
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contention (which is supported in the record) that the court errored in denying the motion to dismiss 
or in the alternative reduce the charge to manslaughter because the state by their own admission, 
failed to establish necessary proof of intent, which is an element of second degree murder, (see 
exhibit $). 
On March 12 or 20, 1990, the court reappointed Alan K. Jeppson, again to the petitioner, know-
ing of a prior conflict of interest. See exhibit $. The court indicated on its minute entry "Mr. Gotay 
indicates to the court that a withdrawal of counsel is filed with the court and that a public a public 
defender be appointed the defendant. Court now finds that the defendant is indigent and that pre-
sent counsel, Gotay has filed a notice of appeal. Alan K. Jeppson has been appointed counsel for 
the present and future action on appointment of other counsel may be considered on motion of the 
defendant." 
The court knew that a conflict existed and errored in its appointment of Mr. Jeppson back to 
the case and leaving the responsibility of filing a motion for new counsel on the defendant or coun-
sel at time that first appeal of right, a crucial and critical proceeding was about to proceed. The trial 
court committed plain error and exhibited wanton indifference to the rights of the petitioner. 
Needless to say when examining exhibit^, Mr. Jeppson continued to represent petitioner over 
objection by Mi Gotay,a nd petitioner which indicated to the court that a conflict existed, when the 
court reappointed Mr. Jeppson 
Further the trial court failed to inquire into this matter which several Federal Circuits as well as 
the U.S. Supreme Court has said is automatic reversal if conflict is proven. 
Conflict is proven in the record and it is proven the court had knowledge. The petitioner has a con-
stitutional right under the sixth and 14th amendment to a fair trial and representation of competent 
counsel, and his proceedings failed to purport to what due process demands. Where, in this case, 
there are several issues where the court has refused to take some action that it is required to do, 
mandamus will lie for connection of the rights that were unjustly deprived. 
Mr. Jeppson failed to keep his client adequately informed and failed to discuss his inent to file a 
Anders Brief. 4 
He violated the rules of professional conduct. He further failed to comply with this courts outline of 
what an Anders brief is to consist of. He further never discussed the issues being raised because 
had he communicated with the petitioner, the petitioner would have insisted on a conflict of interest 
argument about his reappointment. This would have necessarily challenged his competency. 
Council knew he was operating under conflict and this is evident by the quality of the appellant brief 
had prepared, versus the genuine issues of fact which existed. 
In councils failure to comply with the acceptable form of an Anders brief set forth by this court, 
he effectively denied the petitioner of a meaningful first appeal of right. He failed to raise several 
non frivolous issues such as failure of the state to prove intent, why the case wasn't reduced to 
manslaughter by the states admitted statement of lack of direct evidence, and his reappointment to 
a client that had conflict with him. First, counsel failed to articulated arguments for each point coun-
sel did raise in the statement of issues and then objectively demonstrate how each argument or 
issue was in fact frivolous. Second, each issue failed to contain references to the record. The 
issues were not analyzed and appropriate record and legal citations given in each instance. 
Counsel did not engage in sufficient analysis of then record and case law to secure in belief that 
each issue was frivolous. 
Third counsel failed to raise arguable points, namely the reduction of the charge which he 
made reference to pg. 13 of appellants brief, exhibit^ and lack of evidence. Instead counsel on pg 
1 of brief was redundant in listing issues such as issues 3, 4, and 5 which are essentially 1 issue. 
The above issues as well as others contained herein should been argued to the extent that they 
were arguable because they were dead bang winners and upon casual review of the record, 
would leap off the pages. The reason being, they a admitted to by the state and there was no rea-
son not to reduce the charge or dismiss it at all together as Utah Law and Federal Law require. In 
this case the Anders brief did not meet the standards to provide effective assistance of counsel on 
appeal. The brief had no argument. It listed only a few cases but the fact and principles they stood 
for were not stated. Counsel did not maintain an adversarial stance. 
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The court of appeals failed to conduct a comprehensive review of the record because the facts 
of this case are but to obvious from the record. The court further errored because of this 
courts decisions in Clayton and Dunn -v- Cook (discussed herein) clearly explained what an Anders 
brief is supposed to contain and the brief m exh\b\\£ie\\ short of the mark. The court could not have 
been assured that the case was in fact frivolous, or that counsel conducted a comprehensive review 
of the record and case law which support the claims. 
There is a strong likely-hood that substantial injustice has occurred, pursuant to U.R. Crim., P. 
rule 30(a), the errors raised here in and the proposition mandamus stands for. It is prayed that this 
court grant the relief requested herein. 
Why the writ should be issued. 
Mandamus is an extra ordinary writ which lies to compel performance of ministrial act or manda-
tory duty where there is a clear legal right in plaintiff (petitioner), a corresponding duty in defendant 
and a want of any other appropriate and adeqauet remedy. Mandamus has traditionally issued in 
response to abuse of judicial power. 
Thus when a district judge refuses to take some action he is required to or takes some action 
he is not empowered to take, mandamus will lie. 
In this case the court refused to take action that it was required by law to take, such as granting 
the motion to dismiss or reducing the charge to manslaughter based on lack of proof, see 76-1 -501 
U.C.A., refused to grant arrest of judgement or in the alternative a new trial based on issues con-
tained herein, as required by law. 
The greatest requirement of law disregarded by the court was its appointment of counsel who 
petitioner has had conflict with. This judicial No No was scorned in Osborn -v- Shillinger 861 F2d 
612 (10th cir 1988) and U.S. -v- Cronic 466 U.S. 648 (1984) and is governed by Strickland -v-
Washington 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and Cuyler -v- Sullivan 446 U.S. 335 (1980). 
The writ should issue because the court is not empowered with authority to strip petitioner's 14th 
amendment due process right to effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal of right. The 
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court, as stated above, committed numerous error. The court is required by law and Canon, to 
uphold the integrity of the law, not commit plain error! There is a clear legal right that petitioner 
asserts, a corresponding duty in the defendant to assist in appointing the proper remedy, vacation of 
the judgement, enter a new one whereupon an appeal may be taken from the new judgement, 
Rodriquez -v- U.S. 395 U.S. 327,332 (1969); U.S. -v- Wenterhalder, 724 F2d 109 (10th cir. 1983) 
(Per Curiam)(discussing remedies). 
Further the court of appeals failed to undertake a comprehensive review of the record to deter-
mine if in fact the appeal was frivolous. Based on the discussion of the facts, supra at 1^ 4, the court 
failed to abide by this courts decision in State -v- Clayton 639 P2d 168 (UT. 1981) see Anders brief 
of appellant exhibit 1 and counsel in filing that brief, failed to comply with Clayton directions thus 
constituting ineffective assistance of counsel depriving petitioner of effective first appeal of right. 
Reasons for filing the writ in this court 
It is imperative that the highest court in the state decide the constitutionality of the issues and 
procedures complained about herein in a fast efficient manner without intervention by lower courts 
which can only serve to delay the end result. The integrity of Utah's court system must be main-
tained. Secondly any federal review of petitioners claims of procedural irregularity will have to await 
the exhaustion of state remedies which includes a decision by the highest state court of jurisdiction. 
To litigate this matter in lower inferior courts would only ultimately delay the correction of any consti-
tutional problem this case presents, or procedural irregularities the lower courts have with interpret-
ing state and federal law. 
Third, in the instant case, petitioner has been incarcerated almost 61/2 years for an offense 
which he is not factually guilty of and the conviction was obtained by plain procedural irregularities 
and obvious constitutional violations. Petitioner is entitled to the fastest most judicious relief possi-
ble because Of the alleged violations. 
The fourth reason is that the statue oi limitations implemented in 78-12-31.1 could apply to rule 
65 B writ. This inevetabley would be the states argument. That could bar his complaint leaving him 
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without remedy. There is no time bar against rule19 or rule 20 petition in the Utah rules of appellate, 
and because the nature of the rights affected, this court would do well in answering these questions 
and granting the writ. Further, as far as judicial economy is concerned, this court would see this 
case on appeal- at least twicewhere if this court by rts supervisory authority issued the writ, it would 
only see a first appeal of right. Inferior court proceedings are futile. 
This case is governed by many decisions of this court. In this state, this courts decision is con-
trolling law and is based also on stare decisis recognizing decisions of federal courts and the U.S. 
Supreme Court. In this case many of this courts as well as federal mandates have been disregard-
ed or misconstrued by the district court. It is prayed that this court retain jurisdiction over this case 
and enter decision on the issues presented herein. 
Pertinent attachments 
Petitioner attaches two documents where his attorneys withdrew from the case, his motion for 
new trial/arrest of judgement, appellants brief, states interlocutory appeal and a document that sup-
ports that the district court knew that it had appointed Alan K. Jeppeson to a defendant who had an 
active conflict with him. Documents other than those mentioned above contained in the addendum 
are pertinent to the support of issues addressed herein. 
Conclusion 
Types of relief varies in this case to vacation of the judgment to outright reversal which is allowed 
in a case of gross injustice but relief, because of the documentation offered could result in setting 
aside the judgement and directing a judgement for manslaughter. 
Relief in the form of vacation of judgement and entry of a new judgement would be proper. 
It is requested that if this court determines that because of the issues or relief requested herein, 
remand is necessary and this petition be reviewed as an habeas. 
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It is requested that this court waive the statue of limitations in §78-12-31.1 because of good 
cause shown and in the interest of justice. The issues here in warrant review and warrant any time 
bar to be excused because of issues outlined in the attached "motion to excuse statue of limitations 
of repealed and re-enacted U.C.A. § 78-12-31.1.". 
Therefore the petitioner prays that this court retains the case of remand, grants the above named 
motion and retains jurisdiction as it did in State -v- Gibbons 740 P2d 1309 (Ut. 1987) 
Dated this 4 day of 1995 
~J7D<5ty Lyn Brown 
Certificate of Service 
I certify that I have mailed postage prepaided a copy of the foregoing to Jan Graham, Utah 
Attorney General 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 on this day (a of 
ty/fifa., 1995. 
Paul Gotay (1224) 
Gotay Law Office 
Attorney for Defendant 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: 801-265-2833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ; 
Plaintiff, : MOTION OF ARREST OF 
; JUDGMENT/NEW TRIAL 
vs. \ 
DOTY LYN BROWN ; Case No. 
Defendant. [ Judge Raymond S. Uno 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, DOTY LYN BROWN, was found guilty as charged 
of the offense of second degree murder after trial before a 
jury on February 17, 1990. During the course of the trial, 
Defendant moved to dismiss or in the alternative to have the 
charge reduced to a manslaughter at the conclusion of the 
State's case in chief asserting that the State had failed to 
provide sufficient evidence to establish that he did so 
intentionally. The Court denied Defendant's Motion, 
LEGAL STANDARD TO BE APPLIED 
Defendant now seeks to arrest judgment pursuant to 
Section 77-35-23 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended, or in 
the alternative to gain a new trial pursuant to Section 77-
35-24 Utah Code Annotated, 19*53 as Amended. 
The Court may entertain a motion to arrest judgment and 
enter an order in the form of judgment of acquittal 
notwithstanding the jury verdict if the defendant shows that 
jeopardy has attached and that the facts proved at trial do 
not constitute a public offense, or the trial court may enter 
any other order as may be just and proper under the 
circumstances upon showing other good cause. 
An arrest of judgment requires the trial court to look 
at the totality of the circumstances before refusing to enter 
judgment on a verdict because of some error appearing on the 
face of the record. State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah 1988) j 
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987). 
A motion for new trial may be granted in the interest 
of justice upon the defendant showing that error or 
impropriety existed which had a substantial adverse impact 
upon his rights. A motion for new trial differs from an arrest 
of judgment in that the arrest of judgment requires the court 
to determine error from the face of the record and may not 
inquire into proof offered or adduced at trial. A motion for 
new trial is intended to permit the court to correct its own 
errors and avoid further review by examining the entire 
proceedings to determine if a conviction was obtained by 
unfair or unlawful means. State v. Owens, supra. 
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ISSUE 
Defendant contends that it was error for the Court to 
deny his motion to dismiss or in the alternative to reduce 
the charge to a manslaughter at the conclusion of the State's 
case in chief, and urges this Court to reverse that prior 
ruling and grant him an appropriate remedy. 
ARGUMENT 
Resolution of the issue in this case requires examination 
of the legal standard to be applied in granting or denying a 
motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the State fs case in 
chief. A motion to dismiss at this stage of trial should be 
granted if the State has failed to establish a prima facie 
case. A prima facie case is made when a sufficient amount of 
direct and circumstantial evidence has been presented on each 
element of the cause of action to allow the question to be 
submitted to the jury. State v. Romero, 554, P.2d 216, (Utah 
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1976). A prima facie case can be made out under direct or 
circumstantial evidence so long as there exists sufficient 
evidence for a jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, (Utah 1980). 
There is no dispute that the State showed sufficient 
evidence at the conclusion of its case for the jury to 
conclude that the victim1s death involved criminal activity. 
The evidence, however, was not sufficient to prove, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, even if it is proved 
-3-
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he caused her death, did so intentionally, as was charged in 
the complaint for murder in the second degree. 
The verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree 
rests entirely on testimony of defendant being with the victim 
on the evening she disappeared and statements the defendant 
related to witnesses, wherein he does not admit having 
committed the crime. The State's experts could not conclude 
that the murder was committed at close range since evidence 
supporting said theory was not obtained. The State attempts 
to infer intent by the fact that the victim's body was placed 
in a desolate area to avoid detection. 
In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) a jury 
convicted defendant of a second degree murder on evidence that 
showed that the defendant was the last person seen with the 
victim before she disappeared; that the defendant had made 
statements referring to the victim; and that the victim was 
forced into a pit to avoid detection once murdered. The 
Supreme Court held that the above evidence combined with the 
fact, if proven, that defendant caused the victim's death, 
was not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
he did so "intentionally". 
The State offers the fact that the murder weapon is owned 
by the defendant and therefore this should differ the instant 
case from the Petree matter. Defendant proffers that ownership 
of the alleged murder weapon is insufficient evidence from 
which the jury may infer "intent". In State v. Bolsinger, 699 
-4-
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P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985) the defendant admitted wrapping a cord 
around the victim's neck and "....pulling on it11. From that 
statement the State would infer that the defendant intended 
to kill the victim as alleged. The Supreme Court concluded 
that the statement and activity failed to establish inter/; 
because it was vague as to the defendant's state of mind. The 
Supreme Court found that even though defendant admitted the 
deed, his confession offers no clue or hint as to his mens 
rea. Nothing in the exchange between the defendant and the 
victim can form a basis from which an inference to kill or harm 
can be drawn. In the case before this Court, the State 
acknowledged that the motive for this murder is unknown and 
the defendant supported his allegation that there was no 
reason for him to commit said murder, though the testimony 
of other witnesses. 
CONCLUSION 
The fact that the alleged murder weapon was owned by the 
defendant and the fact that the defendant was with the victim 
the night she disappeared does not establish proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt the intent element needed for a second 
degree murder conviction. The State has failed to show, by 
their own admission, that the defendant's mens rea can be 
inferred by the circumstances surrounding thisy^ase. 
TAUL (&TAY X 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
7 A 
I hereby certify that on this Ly^ day of 
1990, I mailed a true and correct copy, postage prep 
the foregoing Motion of Arrest of Judgment/New Trial 
Ronald Elton 
Tooele County Attorney 
Tooele County Courthouse 
47 South Main Street 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
PAUL GDTAY 
Attorney at L. 
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ADDENDUM V 
The State of Utah vs. Doty Lyn Brown 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellee, 
vs. 
DOTY LYN BROWN, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 900316-CA 
APPELLANTS BRIEF 
Appeal from the conviction of March 12, 1990, in the 
Third District Court in and for Tooele County, the 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno presiding, of the crime 
of Second Degree Murder, a First Degree Felony, in 
violation of Section 76-5-203 U.C.A, 1953. 
ALAN K. JEPPESEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
85 North Main Street 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
Telephone: (801) 882-2444 
Facsimile: (801) 882-6520 
PAUL R. VAN DAM 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellee 
236 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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Appellant's Brief 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether it was plain error for the Court to have allowed the 
defendant to withdraw his motion to suppress the testimony of John O'Neil, 
ballistics expert with Department of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 
2. Whether Defendant would have been denied a speedy trial if the 
trial had been continued while the State proceeded with its interlocutory appeal 
of the Court's granting of Defendant's Motion to Suppress the testimony of John 
O'Neil. 
3. Whether the Court erred in admitting the transcript and audio 
taped interview of the defendant when the officers did hot record a recitation 
of defendant's rights under Miranda. 
4. Whether defendant's statements during the interview with the 
Tooele County Sheriffs Office were voluntary. 
5. Whether the defendant's claim subsequent to trial of physical abuse 
prior to the taped interview was an exceptional circumstance warranting review 
by this Court. 
6. Whether a mistrial should have been declared when several women 
jurors were in the rest room at the same time a spectator spoke to the 
defendants mother about the victim's death. 
7. Whether the defendant was permitted an impartial jury of his peers 
when many of the jurors knew the prosecutor or some of the Tooele County 
Sheriff Deputies. 
8. Whether the Court erred in denying the defendant's Motion to 
1 
Appellant's Brief 
Dismiss, made at the conclusion of the State's case in chief. 
9. Whether the Court erred in prohibiting Defendant's witness, Mark 
McDougal, to testify as to the effect of a 41 caliber bullet shot into the head of 
a human at close range. 
10, Whether the Court erred in admitting a cumulative photograph of 
the victim's corpse over Defendant's objection. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the conviction of defendant on March 12, 1990, in 
the Third District Court in and for Tooele County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Raymond S. Uno, district judge, presiding. Defendant was tried by a jury, who 
found him guilty of Second Degree Murder, a first degree felony in the death 
of his wife, Sandra Brown, in violation of Section 76-5-203 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. The date of Judgment, Conviction and Sentence 
was March 12, 1990. Defendant's trial counsel moved to withdraw that same 
date, after first filing a Notice of Appeal. Present counsel was appointed to 
represent the Defendant for the purposes of his Appeal by an Order entered on 
May 29, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The defendant and Sandra McClellan were married on May 7, 1988. 
They resided in Weber and Davis County most of their married life. About 
December 3, 1988, defendant left home1. On December 10, 1988, the victim's 
Ernie Erickson's cross examination, Tr. Vol IV., pp. 112-113. 
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daughter2 and a family friend3 drove the victim to the Salt Lake airport so that 
she could take a flight to Denver4 to meet her husband. That was the last time 
any of her family or friends saw her alive. (T. Vol. VI, p. 109, lines 18-19). 
On December 24, 1988, the defendant left a note on his parent's automobile 
while they were visiting their daughter, Lisa Stapley, who was also the 
defendant's sister, to the effect that Sandra had "taken a bullet meant for me" 
and he had lost the only person he loved (T. Vol. TV, pp.199, 201, lines 1-2). 
Upon going to their car to leave, his parents discovered the note, went back in 
the house to read it, and gave the note to Stan Jones, a detective with the 
Riverside, California police department,5 who was visiting Lisa for the holidays. 
After Defendant's parents left for home, Defendant came to Lisa's door 
and was invited in. Stan Jones, believing that Defendant's note was strange, and 
may have involved a murder, sat in the back of the living room out of the 
lighted portion of the room6 and listened to the defendant as he talked to his 
sister. He appeared to be depressed, but would on occasion become agitated 
and would get up from the kitchen table where he and Lisa were sitting and 
walk around the room talking in an agitated manner (Tr., Vol. V, pp. 161, 185, 
2 
Nikki McClellan, who was 17 at. the time of the incident and had 
been living with Sandra and Doty (Tr. Vol. V, pp. 205, 208). 
Ernie Erickson, who had been defendant's friend since grade school. (Tr. 
VoL. VI., p. 110-111). 
4
 Tr. Vol Vf pp. 206, 208, line 15. 
5Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 124-125. 
6Tr., Vol. V, p. 158-159. 
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lines 20-25; 186). At one point Defendant asked for a drink and got up to get 
a beer from the refrigerator. When he did so, he removed a revolver from his 
pants and placed it on the kitchen table (Tr. Vol. V, p. 162). Stan Jones went 
to the table and took the pistol while defendant was getting the beer from the 
refrigerator and retreated to his hiding place. When the Defendant discovered 
the pistol missing, he became angry. Stan identified himself and told him he 
had the pistol and would return it to the Defendant when he left the residence. 
An argument ensued and it was settled by Stan putting the pistol in Defendant's 
pickup truck and defendant locking the doors. While going to the Truck, Stan 
removed five unfired shells from the gun (Tr. Vol. V, pp. 166, lines 19-23; pp. 
170-171; Exhibit 42). They were 41 magnum caliber bullets (Tr. Vol. V, p. 
163,). 
After leaving Lisa's home, defendant went to his parent's home in Ogden. 
His mother testified that it was understood that Sandra was dead, and that the 
defendant was depressed because of it, but the family did not talk about the 
incident in any detail, (Tr. Vol. VI, p. 127) except to understand that Sandra 
and Doty had been ambushed by someone in Southern Utah , and Sandra had 
been shot by mistake when the people had tried to shoot the defendant (Tr. 
Vol. IV, p.201). 
On Saturday, March 24, 1989, a group of fathers and their sons were 
rabbit hunting on the West side of Johnson's Pass in Tooele County, when two 
of the teenage boys saw, what they thought to be a discarded mattress. They 
discovered, upon closer observation, that the object was a corpse (Tr., Vol. Ill, 
p. 187). The Tooele County Sheriffs Office was called to investigate, and the 
4 
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Sheriff called the State Medical Examiner's office to assist. During the course 
of the investigation, fragments of three bullets were found. One, Exhibit 18, was 
found within the victim's skull7 (Tr. Vol III, p. 244-246; Vol IV, pp. 120, 144). 
) and two were found under the body in the dirt (Exhibits 17 and 19; Tr. Vol. 
Ill, pp. 241-243; Vol IV, p. 121-124). During the investigation, it was also 
discovered that the Defendant had purchased a Smith and Wesson Model 57 
41 magnum caliber pistol (Tr. Vol III, p. 255; Vol IV, p. 159) from Galleson's 
on December 6, 1988 (Tr. Vol IV, p. 158) in his own name. He sold the same 
revolver to Pahl's Pawn Shop on January 27, 1989 (Tr. Vol IV, p. 177-182). 
Defendant through his attorney admitted to the same at trial (Tr. Vol V, p. 
202). 
The pistol was recovered from Pahrs Pawn Shop and delivered with the 
bullet fragments to the State Crime Lab (Tr. Vol V, p. 28). Robert Brinkman, 
the bureau chief of the State Crime Lab, (Tr. Vol V, p. 22, lines 15-17) 
compared the three fragments to two bullets he test fired from the firearm. In 
his opinion, the bullet found in the dirt under the victim's head, Exhibit 19, was 
fired by the defendant's pistol, (Tr. Vol. V, p. 103; Vol IV, p. 143), and the 
fragment found in her head, Exhibit 18, (Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 56, 144), was also 
consistent with having been fired from the defendant's revolver, but he could not 
say with scientific assurance that the other fragment found in the dirt under the 
victim's body was fired from that gun. (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 57, lines 7-9). 
The State called a second ballistic's expert, Mr. John O'Neil, an employee 
7 
The Defendant stipulated that the victim found was his wife, Sandra Brown 
(Tr. Vol IV, p. 168, lines 18-24). 
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of the U. S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 110). 
Prior to the commencement of trial, the Defendant had filed and argued a 
motion to suppress the testimony of Mr. O'Neil on the grounds that the State 
had not complied with the discovery requests of the Defendant, by failing to 
timely inform the Defendant that Mr. O'Neil was going to be a witness or the 
nature of his testimony (Tr. Vol I, p. 8). After lengthy argument, the Court 
granted the defendants motion to suppress (Tr. Vol I, p. 18), whereupon the 
State filed an interlocutory appeal and obtained a restraining order from the 
Supreme Court prohibiting the continuance of the trial until the interlocutory 
appeal was heard (Tr. Vol. II, p. 38). The defendant, then sought to be 
released on bail (Tr. Vol. II, p. 56, lines 16-19). The Court fashioned a bail of 
$30,000 based upon a property bond of $60,000 with the proviso that the same 
bond could be used by the defendant on other charges pending in two other 
courts (Tr. Vol n, p. 62, lines 2-10; p. 63, lines 20-25 and p. 64, line 1). The 
Defendant's counsel asked for a short recess to discuss the matter with his client 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 67, lines 21-25), and upon returning, informed the Court that the 
defendant could not meet the bail requirements and did not want to wait in jail 
while the trial was suspended by the interlocutory appeal, and was therefore 
withdrawing his Motion to Suppress8 (Tr. Vol II, p. 68, lines 19-25; p. 69, lines 
8
-MR. GOTAY: Yes, Your Honor. For the record, let it be known that my 
client, Doty Brown, was present during discussions of the issues before the 
court, and we took a recess so that I could discuss the matter with my client, 
so that he had a better understanding of the repercussions and options left to 
him* And after considerable debate, my client has decided that he would, he's 
requested that I withdraw my motion to suppress the ballistics expert that the 
state wants to include, • . . with the caveat that he's doing so because he 
values more a speedy trial than postponing this matter for an additional sixty 
6 
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1-7). Mr. OfNeil testified that based upon his education, training and 
experience, as well as his examination of the defendant's firearm, Exhibit 26, the 
three bullet fragments, Exhibits 17-19, the two bullets which had been fired by 
Robert Brinkman from the defendant's gun, Exhibit 41, (Tr. Vol V, p. 29, lines 
14-22) and two bullets he fired from the defendant's gun, (Tr. Vol. V, p. 119, 
lines 1-17), that without any doubt the three fragments, Exhibits 17-19 were fired 
from the defendant's gun and from no other (Tr. Vol. V, p. 123, lines 14-15; p. 
125, line 25 and p. 126, lines 1-7; p. 127, lines 11-17; p. 128, lines 22-25 and p. 
129, lines 1-12). He also testified that it was easier to identify Exhibit 18, the 
fragment taken from the head of the victim, after soaking and washing the blood 
and tissue out of the scire on the fragment (Tr. Vol. V, p. 126, lines 17-25). 
While the defendant's counsel carefully and expertly cross examined each of the 
State's witnesses, in great detail, all of the above testimony came into evidence 
without objection. 
Rudy Reit, an investigator on the Staff of the State Medical Examiner's 
Office (Tr. Vol IV, p. 63, lines 5-8) testified that the victim had been shot at 
the scene where the body was found (Tr. Vol IV, p. 70, lines 19-22). Dr. 
Edward Leis, who was a fellow in training in forensic pathology with the Utah 
State Medical Examiner at the time of his autopsy of the victim's body (Tr. Vol 
IV, p. 97, lines 21-22)9, testified that he performed the autopsy on the victim's 
body (Tr. Vol IV., p. 100, lines 2-20). He found that a bullet had gone through 
or ninety [days]." 
9 Defendant stipulated to his qualifications as an expert in the area of 
forensic pathology (Tr. Vol VI., p. 99, lines 2-4). 
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the hood of the victimfs sweater which was bunched up behind her head, without 
striking her body (Tr. Vol IV., p. 104, lines 2-13). He also observed a gun shot 
entrance wound on the left side of the victim's nose (Tr. Vol IV., p. 105, lines 
7-15). There was evidence of gun powder within the wound which led him to 
believe that the weapon had been at close range, about an inch or closer when 
fired (Tr. Vol IV., p. 107, lines 2-19). He testified that in his scientific opinion 
the victim died of a gun shot wound to the head, and that there was only one 
wound to her body (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 116, lines 14-25, p. 117, lines 1-3). All of 
this evidence came in without objection. 
SUMMARY OF DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT 
lliis is a case involving circumstances only. There is no direct evidence 
placing Defendant at the scene of the victim's body, and there was no motive 
for the crime (Tr. Vol in, p. 168, line 21). The uncontroverted evidence was 
that the Defendant loved his wife, and was always mindful of her well being (Tr. 
Vol VI., p. 130, lines 5-12; p. 106, lines 24-25, p. 107, lines 1-6; p. 91, lines 2-
8). The Defendant was not a violent person, and there is no evidence that he 
was had a explosive temper or was cruel (Tr. Vol VI, p. 131-132, lines 1-10). 
From the commencement of the case, when the Defendant was first interviewed 
by the two deputies from Tooele County, he maintained that he did not kill his 
wife, but that she was killed in an ambush by government agents (Vol III, p. 
178, lines 21-23; Vol VI, p. 100, lines 11-15; p. 118, lines 15-25, p. 119, lines 1-
2; p. 127, lines 8-13; Exhibit 2; Vol VI, p. 40, lines 17-25; p. 72, lines 2-22). 
There was also abundant, uncontroverted testimony by those who knew Doty 
8 
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best that he and Sandra had been afraid of someone pursuing them for several 
weeks before Sandra flew to Denver to meet her husband (VoL VI, p. 94, lines 
20-25, p. 95, lines 1-24; p. 107, lines 7-16; p 138, lines 2-18). Hence, Defendant 
established a reasonable explanation for the criminal death of his wife which was 
not refuted by the State. Lastly, Defendant had maintained from the first time 
he was examined by the investigators that he had taken Sandrafs body to a 
remote spot by Nephi, and that she had not died at the spot where her body 
was found by the hunters (Tr. VoL III, p. 181, lines 3-5; Vol. VI, p. 29, lines 9-
14; p. 40, lines 12-25). Uncontroverted evidence existed to support the 
defendant's position: The sun glasses which were worn by the victim had a lens 
missing (Tr. Vol IV, p. 65, lines 13-23). That lens was found some 73 feet from 
her body (Tr. Vol VI., p. 155, lines 10-24). The victim's clothes, including her 
white boots, did not have any mud or debris which would indicate that she had 
walked to the site where her corpse was found (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 90, lines 16-25, 
p. 91, lines 1-13)- Finally, there was no evidence of lividity10 present in the 
body (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 80, lines 3-6). The absence of lividity supported 
defendant's contention that the victim had been killed elsewhere and brought to 
the spot where her corpse was found (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 82, lines 3-9). Hence, the 
defendant provided sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to his 
guilt 
Without the evidence of John O'Neil from the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Lividity or Liver Mortis, as defined by the witness, Rudy, Reit of the 
Medical Examiner's Office is the effect of gravity pooling the body fluids at 
the lowest point of the body after death, causing a darkening of that area of 
the corpse. (Tr. Vol IV, p. 93, lines 4-25, p* 94, lines 1-7). 
9 
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Tobacco and Firearms, the State would have had weak evidence that the bullet 
fragments found in the victim's head and under her body came from the 
defendant's gun. Robert Brinkman, the ballistic's expert with the Utah State 
Crime Lab was not as convincing or precise in his testimony about the reliability 
of his opinion on those issues (Tr. Vol. V, p. 51, lines 21-25, p. 52, lines 1-9; p. 
53, lines 2-11; p. 56, lines 3-21; p. 57, lines 1-16; p. 77, lines 11-22). The Court 
committed plain error to allow the Defendant to withdraw his Motion to 
Suppress after it was already granted. State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah, 
1985) and State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168 (Utah, 1985), citing State v. McCardell, 
652 P.2d 942, 944 (Utah, 1982).11 The period of time the defendant would have 
had to wait for the resumption of the trial would .have allowed his counsel to 
prepare to meet Mr. (Weil's testimony if the Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court's granting of the Motion to Suppress, and the time period in jail would 
have been insignificant compared to the prison sentence upon a conviction based 
upon that testimony. 
While the proper remedy for the tardiness of the discovery revelations of 
Mr. O'Neil's testimony was suppression, the Supreme Court erred in staying the 
trial proceedings while the interlocutory appeal was pending. To stay the trial 
proceedings, denied defendant his right to a speedy trial under the constitution. 
Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, governs the granting of stays on 
Court's ruling will be reversed if the trial court so abused its 
discretion as to create a likelihood that injustice resulted* Said 
considerations should include constitutional rights of the accused. 
10 
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appeals filed by the State.12 There simply was no good cause to grant a stay in 
this instance, and the stay, being granted without a hearing, deprived the-
defendant of the opportunity to be heard on the issue before the effect of the 
stay adversely affected him.13 Hence, he was forced, by the Supreme Court's 
error to give away his valuable right to suppress Mr. O'NeiTs testimony and in 
effect was convicted as a consequence.14 
Shortly after his arrest, the two Tooele County deputy sheriffs assigned to 
investigate the death of Sandra Brown questioned Defendant in the Salt Lake 
County Jail. As indicated by defendant's affidavit attached to this brief and by 
this reference made a part hereof, the defendant was physically assaulted and 
abused by the officers prior to the audio tape recording being commenced. He 
was never explained his rights to counsel or not to speak to the officers, and the 
tape recording contains no such admonitions. Yet, the Court allowed the taped 
interview to be introduced into evidence and given to the jury as Exhibits 48 
and 49 (Tr. Vol VI, p. 23-25). The defendant was prejudiced by the 
introduction of this examination, because he had not been able to speak with an 
12 
Rule 8 (c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: "Stays in criminal cases 
pending appeal are governed by Section 77-35-27 Utah Code Ann. 1953f as amended 
(Rule 27, U. R* Crim. P.)." Rule 27 (a) (3), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
"When an appeal is taken by the state, a stay of any order or judgment in favor 
of the defendant may be granted by the court upon good cause pending disposition 
of the appeal.w 
13 
Good cause means a substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse. 
State v. Estenclon, 625 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Haw., 1981). 
14 
For good cause to exist for stay of court proceedings, there must be a 
showing that the appeal will interfere with and prejudice the criminal 
prosecution. U. S. V. One Single Family Residence, 710 F. Supp. 1351, 1352 (S.D. 
Fla.)« 
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attorney before the recording was made. Had he been able to speak with an 
attorney, he may not have told the officers about the ambush in Southern Utah, 
the accidental killing of his wife by the government agents, and his subsequent 
burial of her body in an area he understood to be in Utah County. He 
understands that the story is not plausible, and may not have come forth were 
his constitutional rights protected, and had the Court not erred in allowing the 
transcript and testimony concerning it to be introduced at trial, State v. Martinez, 
595 P.2d 897 (Utah, 1979); State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440 (Utah, 1986).15 
During the course of the trial, several of the female jurors were in the 
women's rest room at the Court house during a recess when a Mrs. Walker, a 
spectator of the trial began questioning defendant's mother about the victim's 
death. While the Court interrogated all of the women jurors about the incident, 
and only one stated she had heard anything at all, and she said she could not 
really understand what was being said, (Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 34-39) to avoid the taint 
of impropriety, the Court should have declared a mistrial and called a new jury 
to hear the matter, Putro v. Baker, 410 ?2d 717 (Mont., 1966)16 
The defendant was granted many of his challenges of prospective jurors 
for cause, (Tr. Vol. in, pp. 71, 83, 88, 109) he was denied his challenge of two 
members of the panel, Messrs. Nix and Downey (Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 115, 89). Mr. 
Nix knew Alan James, the State's chief criminal investigator, several other police 
15But see Fjeldsted v. Cox, 611 P.2d 382 (Utah, 1980), Miranda rights only 
have to be explained when the statements are inculpatory, not when they are 
exculpatory* 
An improper jury influence which has a natural tendency to prejudice the 
verdict is grounds for a mistrial. 
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or sheriffs deputies, (Tr. Vol., Ill, p. I l l ) he grew up in the same neighborhood 
as the county attorney who tried the case, and knew him in school (Tr. Vol HI, 
p. 113). Mr. Evensen knew several of the deputy sheriffs, including Alan James. 
He called them by their first names (Tr. Vol. III., pp. 86-89). Defendant should 
have been allowed a panel of prospective jurors who had no personal 
acquaintanceship with any of the witnesses, parties or their counsel, Goff v. 
Kinzle, All P.2d 105 (Mont., 1966) and Salt Lake City v. United Park City Mines, 
Co., 503 P.2d 850 (Utah, 1972).17 
At the conclusion of the State's case, the defendant moved to dismiss (Tr. 
Vol. 84), arguing that this case is not significantly different from State v. Petri, 
659 P.2d 443 (Utah, 1983). The last person to have seen the victim was 
probably the defendant. There was no direct evidence, however linking her 
death to the defendant or placing him at the scene of her death. Just as in the 
Petri case, there was not enough evidence to convict the defendant. The State 
had failed to carry its burden of proof, and hence, he should be acquitted and 
the case dismissed. The Court erred when it failed to grant that motion, or at 
least reduce the charge. 
Defendant did not have the funds with which to obtain more than one 
expert witness to counter the testimony of the State's witnesses, including the 
medical examiner, medical examiner's investigator, and the two ballistics experts. 
However, he did call one witness, a person who had possessed federal firearms 
license for six years, had a bachelor's degree from Brigham Young University 
Improper conduct charged to one juror is chargeable to the entire panel, 
and the finder of fact may not go outside the evidence in reaching a verdict. 
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and a Juris Doctor degree from the University of Puget Sound, who had been 
a deputy county attorney in Thurston County, State of Washington in the major 
felony division for one year and worked on six homicide cases. He had also 
clerked for the Superior Court and was familiar with several homicide cases 
involving firearms. He was then a City Prosecutor for a City Attorney, and 
handled many firearms cases (Tr. Vol. VI, p. 144-145). The defendant intended 
to offer his testimony as to the powder marks, etc., that would have been found 
upon the victim's face had she been shot as the State's witnesses had testified 
(Tr. Vol. VI, p. 147, lines 20-25, p. 148, lines 1-3 and 12-14). The Court would 
not accept the witness as an expert, thereby depriving the defendant of his only 
expert testimony to rebut the experts who testified for the State. The Court 
should have permitted the witness to testify out of the presence of the Jury to 
first determine exactly what the witnesses qualifications were, before denying the 
i1 
witness the right to be examined before the Jury, and disqualifying him only on 
the arguments of counsel (Tr. Vol VI, pp. 184, line 16 through p. 152, line 22). 
If the proper foundation had been laid, including the expertise of the witness, 
his degree of familiarity with the necessary facts, and the logical nexus between 
his opinion and the facts adduced, his opinion would have been admissible. 
Edward v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah). 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is the defendant's position that an accumulation of errors 
convicted him. Had John O'Neil not testified, had his examination at the Jail 
not been introduced, had his expert not been excluded, had a truly impartial jury 
panel been selected, had the court granted his motion to dismiss been granted, 
he would have been acquitted. The accumulation of these errors led to an 
unfair and prejudicial trial, and his conviction should be reversed and he should 
be released from incarceration. 
Finally, after a thorough and conscientious examination of the record, 
counsel for Defendant has concluded that the appeal of this matter is wholly 
without merit, and pursuant to the provisions of State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 
(1981), counsel has prepared this brief raising all issues which could arguably be 
brought for Defendant. Counsel has informed Defendant that should he wish 
to address the Court on the issues raised or such other issues as he may decide 
have merit, that he would be given an opportunity to do so, but that counsel 
would move the Court to permit his withdrawal from the case. Defendant has 
requested that counsel move the Court to grant him an additional sixty (60) days 
within which to prepare his own brief on appeal, and counsel has prepared a 
15 
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separate motion to that effect and submits the same to the court 
contemporaneously with this brief M 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney 
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